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Leverage is one of the most important financial factors to the survival and viability of 
agricultural cooperatives (e.g., wine cooperatives) during a period of intense competi-
tion. Leverage is influenced both by the behavior of managers and cooperative mem-
bers. An empirical study for the Douro Demarcated Region Wine Cooperatives (DDR-
WC) supports the hypothesis that managers have a positive influence in the determina-
tion  of  the  equity/total  assets  ratio  and  that  individualistic  behavior  of  cooperative 
members has a negative influence in the value of this ratio. This paper suggests that 
there may be value in reconsidering cooperatives in the context of a so-called Mediter-
ranean model. 
 




Not unlike their counterparts in the United States, Northern Europe, Australia and 
New Zealand, Portuguese cooperatives are legally organized following a traditional co-
operative  structure  with  open  membership,  democratic  control,  restricted  residual 
claims, and benefits to members proportional to patronage. But there are fundamental 
behavioral differences in Portuguese cooperatives that appear to be rooted in socio-
economic factors. This observation is particularly  true in the oldest, most important 
wine production region of Portugal, the Douro Demarcated Region (DDR). There, the 
wine cooperatives (DDR-WC) appear to follow a so-called “Mediterranean model” that 
has  either  no  full-time  professional  manager  or  a  weak  manager.  Interestingly,  this 
model is also the norm in Brazil (possibly most of South America), where the lack of 
managerial leadership is the Achilles heel of effective cooperative behavior (personal 
communication with Fabio Chaddad, June 2004). 
Like many agricultural cooperatives, the DDR-WC increasingly face survival chal-
lenges related to financial issues. Factors such as member equity capital acquisition and 
redemption are well-known constraints on growth and sustainability that arise from ill-
defined property rights in the cooperative environment (Cook and Iliopoulos 2001). 
This ubiquitous problem, however, may be more complicated in countries like Portugal, 
where  strong  managerial  leadership  often  is  lacking.  Superficially  at  least,  manager 
power appears to be fundamental to optimal cooperative capitalization, though there has 
been limited empirical research on the role of property rights and managerial behavior 
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on the economic performance of agricultural cooperatives (Cook, 1994). We suspect the 
limited empirical attention to this matter stems in part from the fact that the Mediterra-
nean model is not widely appropriate.  
This paper provides an empirical examination of property rights, specifically the be-
havior of members and managerial behavior, on the economic performance of DDR-
WC. We use a coalition-theoretic structure (Staatz, 1983). Following Russo et al. (2000) 
and Chaddad and Cook (2002), we analyze the effects of member behavior and the 
power, meaning influence or control, that managers have over the capital structure of 
DDR-WC. The results of this analysis lead us to posit that cooperative research might 
benefit from distinguishing the Mediterranean model from cooperative models that are 
more appropriate in much of the world. 
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 provides the back-
ground of the DDR-WC. The conceptual framework is presented in Section 3. Here we 
develop the framework to examine the hypothesis that the financial structure of DDR-
WC is profoundly influenced by the characteristics of the property rights attached to the 
cooperatives and, consequently, cooperative governance (Williamson, 1996). Section 3 
begins with a brief overview of salient literature before discussing the model and data. 




Wine Cooperatives in Douro Demarcated Region  
The DDR is situated in northeastern Portugal, on the steep banks of the Douro River. 
It is the most important wine-production region in Portugal, representing about 20% of 
the national production and about half of the value, mainly due to the more valuable 
Porto  wine  sales  (Rebelo,  2001).  Total  annual  DDR  wine  production  averaged 
1,282,676 hectoliters in the 1990s (47% table wine and 53% Porto). WC produce a 
greater percentage of table wines, accounting for 58% of total DDR table wine produc-
tion, while WC Porto wines account for 38% of DDR Porto production. 
The unique need for and challenges facing DDR-WC are evident from a combination 
of demographic and socio-economic data. Vineyards cover almost 1/3 of the total usable 
land in the Douro region, most of which is owned by small farms. There are 38,588 ha 
of vineyards on 85,000 parcels owned by 33,000 small wine producers. Each of these 
small producers owns an average of l.17 ha, making cooperation a vital element to their 
economic well being. Twenty-two wine cooperatives represent roughly 16,000 small 
growers.  
Effective cooperation and cooperative performance are challenged by a variety of 
highly unusual cooperative characteristics. DDR-WC have large memberships, averag-
ing 723 members (286 to 2056 members). This alone dramatically increases transaction 
costs associated with cooperative decision making. Furthermore, only twelve of the 22 
cooperatives have a full-time manager or director; the largest one has both. Wine pro-
duction per member typically is quite limited. 58% of all cooperative members produce 
10 or fewer barrels of wine (550 liters per barrel); 82% of the members produce fewer 
than 20 barrels. Inability of members to make informed decisions concerning coopera-
tive finance is further complicated by two additional factors. First, the level of formal 
education is limited for most WC members; 85% of the 2056 members have less than 4 
years of education. Second, the WC are likely to have short planning horizons because   2008, Vol 9, )o 2  7 
 
sixty-one percent of the members are at least 50 years old. All of these characteristics 
militate against optimal cooperative performance, especially capital accumulation and 
retained earnings for growth. Nevertheless, DDR-WC grew throughout the 1990s, con-
sistent with that of the Portuguese economy. Total assets increased 46%; fixed assets 
increased  180%;  members  increasingly  supported  investment;  and  cash-flow/gross 
revenues increased, indicating additional retained funds. Overall leverage and financial 
structure improved. See Table 1. 
The apparent contradiction between DDR-WC growth and the socio-economic pro-
file of members might be explained, in part, by testable propositions about the expected 
behavior of members and managers. Whether or not the cooperative performance bene-
fited from a fulltime manger or director is unclear and is a centrepiece of this study. 
This is accomplished in the next section, which presents a conceptual framework based 




Work in the theory of the cooperative firm suggests the presence of transaction costs 
within this traditional structure (Vitaliano, 1983 and Staatz, 1987). These transaction 
costs are generated by a set of vaguely defined property rights constraints originating 
from  the  structure  of  traditional  cooperatives  and  leading  to  conflicts  over  residual 
claims and decision control. The five vaguely defined property rights constraints are the 
free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control and influence costs problems (Cook, 1995). Sim-
ply put, property rights within the traditional cooperative structure do not provide mem-
bers with the necessary incentives to make optimal investment decisions (Cook and 
Iliopoulos, 2001). The socio-economic profile of Douro wine cooperative members de-
scribed in the previous section—large number of small farms, and relatively unedu-
cated, older members—lend further support to the argument that members have limited 
incentives to invest in the cooperative. 
In addition to investment constraints, ill-defined property rights generate collective 
decision-making problems in traditional cooperatives, namely, the control and influence 
costs problems. The control problem is similar in nature to the shareholder-manager 
problem in investor-owned firms (IOF), but is amplified by the lack of external com-
petitive market pressures (e.g., equity markets and the market for corporate control) that 
help discipline IOF managers. Influence costs are inherent to all organizations where 
decisions affect wealth distribution among stakeholders. In addition to influence activi-
ties among employees and managers, cooperative members may also attempt to influ-
ence the decision-making process. Influence costs are greater when there are different 
interests among group members and when the potential gains are great. 
According to coalition theory, the cooperative consists of many groups with different 
objectives. Each attempts to maximize their own individual utility, often at expense of 
other groups. This situation is particularly relevant to agricultural cooperatives because 
costs and benefits can be allocated among groups according to a variety of rules (Zus-
man, 1982). The coalition decides which groups will benefit and which will bear the 
cost of operations by setting prices for member products, offering specific services, and 
choosing capitalization strategies. In this context, sufficiently high transaction costs 
within the groups may promote Pareto inefficient strategies. In fact, if transaction costs 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   2008, Vol 9, )o 2  9 
 
no incentive to negotiate an efficient solution based on the compensation principle. As a 
consequence,  cooperative  strategies  will  not  be  determined  solely  by  the  efficiency 
principle, but also by the initial distribution of resources and power among coalition 
groups, cooperative members and the manager.  
  Fama (1980) Fama and Jensen (1983a and 1983b) arrive at this conclusion from an 
agency theoretic perspective. Managers act as agents of the principal (members) and 
attempt to optimize the value of their pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. However, 
management behavior implied by agent utility maximization allows for departures from 
profit maximization or member return optimization in IOF and cooperatives.  
Clearly, the sheer size and socio-economic profile of DDR-WC complicate what is a 
generally difficult managerial environment for cooperatives. Whereas mangers and ex-
ecutive leadership are ordinarily presumed vital to the economic performance of a coop-
erative, it is at best unclear whether DDR-WC performance benefited from or changed 
due to a full-time manger or director. The manager’s task is likely to be far more formi-
dable than in more traditional cooperatives exemplified throughout the cooperative lit-
erature. In fact, the presumption that a manager has substantial discretionary power in 
setting cooperative strategies and policies may not fit the Mediterranean model.  
The DDR-WC context is nearly ideal for testing this hypothesis. Not only is the 
number of cooperatives with a full-time hired manager/director approximately equal to 
those without one (12 versus 10), all 22 DDR-WC have similar socio-economic profiles. 
Furthermore, DDR-WC managers are compensated on fixed wages, not performance. 
This fact means one would expect the hired managers to pursue risk minimizing strate-
gies rather than returns to members. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that when DDR-
WC managers effectively influence the capital structure through their bargaining power, 
the expected average equity/asset ratio would be higher than found in cooperatives lack-
ing a hired manager. The capital structure would also be more sensitive to risk and less 
sensitive to the profitability and the cost of financing (Russo et al., 2000).  
 
Hypothesis: A strong DDR-WC manager will advance risk minimizing strategies 
rather than returns to members. 
•  The equity/asset ratio will be higher than in cooperatives lacking a hired manager.  
•  The capital structure will be more sensitive to risk and less sensitive to the profit-
ability and the cost of financing. 
 
To test this hypothesis concerning manager power, member behavior, and capital 
structure, we follow Russo et al. (2000). Nine years of financial data (1990-1998) were 
obtained from the 22 DDR-WC, yielding a total of 198 observations. The data were col-
lected from financial statements of each cooperative. These data were then, applied to 
an equity/asset regression model to assess, among other things, the role of manager 
power and member behavior on DDR-WC capital structure. 
 
 
Methods and Results 
Following Russo et al. (2000), the capital structure of DDR-WC is modeled as a 
function of cooperative profitability, the cost of debt financing, the weight of fixed as-
sets relative to total assets, a measure of manager’s power, and the way members par-10  AGRICULTURAL ECO)OMICS REVIEW 
ticipate  in  the  cooperative.  We  also  introduce  an  annual  trend  to  track  structural 
changes, like technological progress. We begin the description of this model by first de-
fining two indicator variables that capture manager’s power and behavior of members. 
 
Manager’s power 
Russo et al. (2000) developed a quantitative measure of manager power, i.e., the abil-
ity of effectively influence capitalization strategies by imposing capital retention prefer-
ences on the cooperative. We apply that measure to DDR-WC, though data limitations 
prohibit considering one of the elements—member participation in cooperative man-
agement.  
Strong managers are expected to reduce resource transfer to members, both in terms 
of profits and patronage. Two indicators of manager strength are defined in this study. 
The first indicator is the percentage of annual revenues transferred to patrons/members 
(PPi),which is measured as patronage refund (PRi) divided by gross revenues (Ri); PPi = 
PRi/Ri. The second indicator is the percentage of annual revenues retained (PCi), which 
is measured as retained net income after taxes (NIATi) plus depreciation (Depi), all di-
vided  by  gross  revenues;  PCi  =  (NIATi  +  Depi)/Ri.  In  accordance  with  theory,  one 
would expect PPi to be negatively correlated to leverage (measured as the ratio of equity 
to assets), while PCi would be positively correlated to leverage. Based on 198 observa-
tions of DDR-WC, the calculated correlation between each index and leverage is shown 
in the final column to conform to a priori sign expectations. 
 















Percentage of annual 
revenues transferred to 
patrons/members 
Negative  -0.0475 
PCi 
Percentage of annual 
revenues retained by the 
cooperative 
Positive  0.410 
1 Computed for the 198 observations (9 years x 22 DDR-WC). 
 
A manager power index (MPIi) is constructed for each of the i cooperatives. That in-
dex is the sum of two indicator variables that are functions of PPi and PCi.  
  MPIi = f (–PPi) + f (PCi)  (1) 
The function f is defined as: 
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where:  xij  is the value of the two variables (PPi and PCi) for the i
th cooperative;   j x   is 
the sample mean of variable j; and  j σ represents the sample standard deviation.  
MPIi ∈ [–2 to +2]. Since managerial agents are expected to first maximize their own 
utility, and then, members’ utility, a positive value denotes “strong” management, while 
a negative value implies “weak” management. The null value indicates a neutral or bal-
anced distribution between these two objectives.  
The manager power indicator findings are summarized in Table 3 for all DDR-WC, 
over the nine-year study period. The majority of the DDR-WC (79%) exhibited neutral 
or balanced managerial power over most of the nine years. This finding is consistent 
with the fact that most WC are patronized by small farmers and managed on a voluntary 
basis by a board of directors (Rebelo et al., 2002). Interestingly, several of the average 
values for strong managers are well below their neutral- or weak-manager counterparts. 
Only average cash flow and average equity are greatest for the strong manager category. 
Consistent with prior expectations, the least leveraged WC are managed by strong man-
agers. This observation is evident by comparing the average equity/assets ratio, which is 
0.36, 0.23 and 0.24 for strong, neutral and weak, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for manager power index (euro values in millions) 
 
Strong 
MPIi > 0 
Heutral 
MPIi = 0 
Weak 
MPIi < 0 
Total sample 
Number of observations   22.00  157.00  19.00  198.00 
Average revenues  1.84  3.09  3.45  2.83 
Average value of grapes  0.99  2.01  1.90  1.89 
Average cash flow  0.31  0.13  -0.003  0.13 
Average equity  1.46  1.24  0.88  1.23 
Average total assets  4.07  5.39  3.59  5.07 
Source: Financial statements of DDR-WC 
 
The MPIi index is subsequently redefined as a zero-one indicator variable, i.e, man-
ager  power  index  indicator  (MPIIi)  for  use  in  the  equity/asset  regression  model.  
MPIIi = 1  if  MPIi > 0 (strong manager), otherwise  MPIIi = 0 (weak manager).  
 
Behavior of members 
To evaluate the potential effects of member behavior on DDR-WC financial struc-
ture, we surveyed the chairmen of the WC boards of directors. This survey took place in 
1998/1999, using face-to-face interview techniques. For more details see Rebelo et al 
(2002). Each was asked: 
 
Do  the  members  behave  individualistically,  viewing  the  cooperative  simply  as 
buyer of their products and “leaving” the cooperative when it experiences diffi-
culties, namely in low production years?  
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The answers were used to construct an indicator variable that is related to the way 
individual members behave, i.e., exercise their property rights in the cooperative. Define 
the indicator variable for individualistic behavior of members (IB), as IB = 1 if the an-
swer is yes, i.e., members are perceived to vote according to individual interests rather 
than cooperative interests, zero otherwise. Individualistic behavior is expected to have a 
negative influence on capital structure. Like MPII, this dichotomous variable was incor-
porated as an explanatory variable in equity/asset regression model.  
 
The equity/asset regression model 
Specification of the equity/asset model is given in Table 4. The equity asset ratio is 
specified as a linear function of the five exogenous variables described in Table 4, along 
with expected parameter signs.  
 
Table 4. Exogenous variables of the equity/asset model 
Variable  Description  Definition  Expected  
sign 
Prof  A proxy for cooperative profit-
ability  (PR+NIAT +Dep)/R  Positive, null 
Int  A proxy the cost of debt financ-
ing 
Intex/(TA-Equity) 
Intex = Interest expenses 
TA = Total assets 
Positive, null 
FATA  The ratio between fixed assets 
and total assets  Fixed assets/TA  Positive 
MPII  An indicator variable for the 
power of manager cooperative 
MPII =1, if MPI > 0 
MPII =0 if MPI ≤ 0 
Positive 
IB  An indicator variable of member 
behavior 
IB =1 if the behaves indi-
vidualistically  
IB = 0, otherwise 
Negative 
T  A annual trend variable to reflect 
structural changes  T = 1, . . . , 9  Positive, null, 
or negative 
 
The model was estimated using generalized least squares (GLS). Both random and 
fixed effects models were rejected despite presence of panel data. Heteroskedasticity 
was  detected  with  a  White  test  (5%  significance  level)  and  corrected  for  using  the 
Newey-West method. Statistical results are given in Table 5. All signs of estimated co-
efficients coincide with the expectations given in Table 4.  
A significant temporal trend due to unknown structural factors was found. The equity 
asset  ratio  increased  at  a  rate  of  1.1%  per  year  during  the  1990s.  The  average  eq-
uity/asset ratio is not sensitive to the profitability (Prof) and cost financing (Int); regres-
sion coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant. This result is consis-
tent with Portugal joining the European Community in 1986. DDR-WC could invest in 
new technology to improve vinification and to vertically integrate into bottling, financed 
by European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Funds-Guidance (EAGGF-G). The   2008, Vol 9, )o 2  13 
 
resulting 60% capital subsidy reduced leverage needs. The most interesting statistical 
result is that manager’s power (MPII) and member behavior (IB) are both significant 
and  conflicting  determinants  of  cooperative  capital  structure.  The  positive  sign  on 
FATA indicates that managers, generally strive to reduce risk-induced operating lever-
age. However, there is also statistical evidence of a small positive influence of man-
ager’s power in the determination of the equity/asset ratio, which is at least partially off-
set by members acting more out of self-interest than collective interest in the coopera-
tive. 
 
Table 5. Equity/asset ratio GLS regression results 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept  0.177*  8.313 
T  0.011*  3.188 
Prof  0.006  0.595 
Int  -0.090  0.559 
FATA  0.207*  2.446 
MPII  0.082*  2.710 
IB  -0.047*  -3.746 
GLS weighted R
2  0.284   
F-statistic  12.62*   
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.815   
* Significant at 5% level 
 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
Like many other agricultural cooperatives, DDR-WC increasingly face survival chal-
lenges related primarily to financial issues linked to acquiring and redeeming member 
equity capital and manager’s power, both of which can be constraints on growth and 
sustainability. The objective of this paper was to analyze the effects of member behavior 
and the power that managers have over the capital structure of DDR-WC. As expected, 
the results of the model show that during the 1990s: (1) managers, in general, had a 
positive  but  relative  anemic  influence  in  the  determination  of  the  equity  asset  ratio 
(capital structure), (2) the individualistic behavior of cooperative members had a nega-
tive influence in the value of this ratio. These results show that in the pursuit of selfish 
interests, the different goals of DDR-WC members and managers have adverse conse-
quences on the capital structure/leverage of the cooperative. DDR-WC have much to 
gain if these conflicting goals could promote a common vision. By striving to achieve 
the same goals, DDR-WC may increase overall efficiency, which is essential to eco-
nomic success in the increasingly competitive world wine market.  
The traditional cooperative model adopted by DDR-WC may not be adequate for de-
veloping the commonality of goals needed in an increasingly competitive market envi-
ronment, where risk-taking and extensive investments in new products are part of the 14  AGRICULTURAL ECO)OMICS REVIEW 
decision-making process. New Generation Cooperatives (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999) 
may be essential to solve the conflicts over residual claims and decision control. How-
ever, special consideration should be given to the development of a so-called Mediter-
ranean model of new generation cooperative that addresses the unusual socio-economic 
structure of cooperatives comprised of many small farms with relatively uneducated, 
older members. This context poses special challenges to optimal capital formation. Two 
issues are of particular importance in this context are: (1) developing a better under-
standing of member investment minimizing behavior, including the degree of member-
ship  heterogeneity;  and  (2)  improving  the  cooperative  internal  bargaining  process 
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